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INTRODUCTION
Dawn Murray teaches biology and biotechnology at Oceanside
High School in San Diego. ... [I]n 1993, when co-workers
learned that Murray is a lesbian, she became the target of
vicious anti-gay remarks, rumors, and insults. And school
officials failed to promote Murray to student activities
director-though she was the top candidate. Someone with her
"lifestyle," a school official objected, "shouldn't be that close to
the kids." . .. Obscene graffiti was repeatedly painted outside
her classroom. When she complained about the harassment,
school officials failed to investigate and threatened her with
disciplinary action if she persisted.1
George Eighmey worked as an attorney for an Illinois law firm.
When the senior partner discovered Eighmey was gay, he was
fired. After moving to Oregon, Eighmey was offered a
partnership with a new law firm. ... Then [the Illinois firm]
asked his former employers if they would hire Eighmey back if
he returned. ... [Eighmey] then told them the story of being
fired for being gay. The Oregon law firm rescinded its offer of
a partnership, saying "Our clients wouldn't accept a gay
attorney and we'll lose business if we hire you."'
To some, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
1. DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION: A SPECIAL REPORT FROM THE HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FEATURING CASES OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION IN AMERICA'S WORKPLACES 41 (2001) [hereinafter DOCUMENTING
DISCRIMINATION], available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
2. Id. at 42.
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Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.3 may be the result of a judicial
skirmish in what Justice Scalia has referred to as the "culture war,"
highlighting judicial conflict between secular and religious concerns.4
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit declined to affirm the plaintiff's
allegations of Title VIP religious discrimination. Peterson's claim
challenged Hewlett-Packard's refusal to accommodate his
condemnation of his gay and lesbian co-workers, asserting that his
actions constituted a religious mandate.6 Beyond the apparent
political and cultural conflicts the case exposed, however, it serves the
broader function of advancing the judicial and academic discourse
relating to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 and its
application in cases of workplace harassment.
This Recent Development argues that, although the court's
holding in Peterson is laudable, the opinion underscores some
inconsistencies in Title VII jurisprudence pertaining to workplace
harassment.8 Accordingly, this Recent Development articulates two
distinct levels of incongruence that the case exposes. First, because
Title VII fails to protect explicitly gay and lesbian employees,9 those
gay employees who face harassment on the basis of sexual orientation
are unable to assert their own claims of discrimination under Title
VII, though the court recognizes the ability of their employers to
3. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
4. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring
the majority decision to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), a decided
move taking sides in what he describes as the "culture war").
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
6. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 602.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
8. Title VII is applied in two broadly defined circumstances. The first covers the
commission of discrimination on the basis of its named categories of status, which is
characterized either by disparate treatment or a disparate impact on the employee of that
status. The second covers workplace harassment or hostile work environment theory,
which includes either the commission of harassing conduct or complicity by an employer
allowing such conduct. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. This Recent
Development primarily addresses the functioning of the latter harassment theory of Title
VII protection.
9. It is worth noting that the author in many ways subscribes to the prevailing notion
explicated in the social science literature and conversations within the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer communities that see gender and sexuality as
beyond the gay/straight binary most often articulated in broader culture. Nonetheless, for
pragmatic and strategic reasons, the articulation of this issue is most effectively
accomplished using that binary language, given the parlance of the legal community and
the current posture of efforts at legal reform within that community. Therefore, the
language of this piece follows that binary language, referring to gay and lesbian people, as
opposed to the broader spectrum of sexual identities, though those may be included in any
legal attempts to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and should be
considered in broader reform strategies.
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remedy such harassment. These employees are therefore at the
mercy of their employers to avoid such harassment. Second, Peterson
indicates that under the doctrine of religious harassment stemming
from Title VII's protection from religiously based discrimination,
proselytizing by religious employees could be subject to greater
scrutiny than other forms of harassment.
To illuminate these inconsistencies, this Recent Development
focuses on the silent but salient figures in this suit: the gay employees
at Hewlett-Packard. It explores the possible Title VII harassment
claims such employees would have in order to more ably articulate
the inconsistencies in Title VII. It shows that on the facts of Peterson,
such gay employees could have a viable claim against Hewlett-
Packard for religiously based harassment, but would have no claim
under the same circumstances if a co-worker made homophobic
comments that were secular in origin.
The significance of these inconsistencies reaches beyond a mere
exercise in statutory interpretation. Consideration of this case is not
simply intended to confront a particular failure of statutory and
jurisprudential logic within Title VII but also to bear on a very real
and important exploration of power and inequity within the
employment relationship in general. Title VII offers a distinctly
unique remedy to employees who suffer harassment in the
workplace." Its existence, therefore, suggests an acknowledgment
that employees working in an environment where harassment based
on invidious bigotry is tolerated and allowed is unacceptable."
Nevertheless, gay and lesbian employees do not have protection from
the very real and prevalent discrimination and harassment many face
on the basis of their sexual orientation.
Indeed, gay and lesbian employees subject to such harassment
are faced with two equally problematic options: either endure the
harassment and its likely emotional, psychological, and physical
damages, 2 or quit the job and face the resulting economic and
10. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (affirming a Title VII sexual
harassment claim); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (holding
that Title VII's protection from discrimination on the basis of sex encompasses sexual
harassment resulting in a hostile work environment for the employee); Daniels v. Essex
Group, 937 F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming plaintiff's claim of racial
harassment when he suffered constant racist epithets, death threats, racist graffiti, and the
hanging of a black man in effigy at his workplace); Goldberg v. City of Philadelphia, No.
Civ. A. 91-7575, 1994 WL 313030 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding actionable religious harassment
when employee suffered constant and violent anti-Semitic epithets).
11. Id.
12. In his article on the problems of workplace harassment, David Yamada cited the
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personal damage.13 By showing the logical outcome suggested by an
alteration of Peterson's facts, this Recent Development suggests that
the concentration of Title VII jurisprudence on the actions of an
outside party, and not the impact on the injured employee, result in
moving away from the goal of eradicating such damage. This
consequence demands, therefore, a deeper analysis and critique of
the operation and limitations of Title VII.
I. PETERSON V. HEWLETT-PACKARD
14
The precipitous event in Peterson occurred when Hewlett-
Packard management instituted a program to promote tolerance
within their workplace through the development of a workplace
diversity campaign.15  As part of the campaign, the company
displayed five different "diversity posters" depicting photographs of
various employees accompanied by the captions "Black," "Blonde,"
"Old," "Gay," or "Hispanic."" In a second series of posters, the five
employees were depicted in a photograph together, with the caption:
"Diversity is Our Strength."' 7
Despite the best efforts of Hewlett-Packard, long-time employee
Richard Peterson responded to the campaign with less tolerance than
the company had hoped. Peterson felt a spiritual mandate to respond
to the campaign with a condemnation of gay people as well as
Hewlett-Packard's support of its gay employees.18 In the words of the
court, "Peterson describes himself as a 'devout Christian,' who
believes that homosexual activities violate the commandments
contained in the Bible and that he has a duty 'to expose evil when
confronted with sin.' "19 In response to his mandate, Peterson posted
severe emotional impact such hostility has on the employees who are its victims. See
David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status
Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 483 (2000). This type of
emotional (and sometimes physical) violence in the workplace has been found to cause
stress, depression, low self-esteem, and even Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id.
13. North Carolina, for example, is like most states, in offering a bleak job market to
those who are compelled to leave their jobs. See, e.g., ELIZABETH JORDAN, THE STATE
OF WORKING NORTH CAROLINA 1-2 (2004) (showing increasing unemployment, high
percentages of those in part-time jobs desiring full-time work, and an increasing wage
gap), available at http://www.ncjustice.org/btc/2004pubs/swnc04.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
14. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
15. Id. at 601.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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large copies of scripture passages in his cubicle which he believed
suggest a condemnation of gay people, including passages from Isaiah
3:9 and Leviticus 20:13.20 Peterson's supervisors removed his posters
after a determination that they were in violation of Hewlett-Packard's
harassment policy, which stated that "[any comments or conduct
relating to a person's race, gender, religion, disability, age, sexual
orientation, or ethnic background that fail to respect the dignity and
feeling [sic] of the individual are unacceptable. 21
During several meetings with Hewlett-Packard managers,
Peterson insisted that he was compelled to post the scripture passages
in hopes that the gay and lesbian employees at Hewlett-Packard
would "read the passages, repent, and be saved. '22 Peterson also
asserted that the diversity campaign was "an initiative to 'target'
heterosexual and fundamentalist Christian employees at Hewlett-
Packard, in general, and him in particular. '23 Peterson conveyed to
his managers that he would only cease to post the scripture passages if
Hewlett-Packard removed the diversity campaign poster featuring a
gay employee. 24  Hewlett-Packard managers refused. 25  After
numerous meetings between Peterson and Hewlett-Packard
managers, the company was unable to find a solution to the impasse,
and Peterson was discharged. 26 He filed suit against Hewlett-Packard
claiming religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.27 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
finding of summary judgment in the Title VII claim, on a de novo
review.21
Peterson advanced his Title VII claim under two different
theories: disparate treatment relative to other employees who were
not in the targeted class (in this case, non-religious employees); and
20. Id. at 601-02. The verses on Peterson's posters read, "[t]he shew of their
countenance doth witness against them; and they declare their sin as Sodom, they hide it
not. Woe unto their soul! For they have rewarded evil unto themselves," id. at 601 (citing
Isaiah 3:9), and "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them
have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be put
upon them," id. at 601-02 (citing Leviticus 20:13). But see John 15:12 (New International
Version) ("My command is this: Love each other as I have loved you.").
21. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 602.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Peterson also alleged violations of state law. Id.
28. Id. at 602, 608.
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Hewlett-Packard's failure to accommodate his religious practices.2 9
The court dispensed of the disparate treatment claim, holding that
Peterson failed to show that he was treated any differently than other
employees because of his religion, finding instead that he was
discharged as a result of his violation of the company's harassment
policy and for his insubordination upon management's request that
he remove the scripture passages.30
On Peterson's accommodation theory, the court assumed
arguendo that Peterson's posting of the scripture passages was
required by his religious beliefs. 31 The court analyzed the legitimacy
of the two accommodations requested by Peterson: for Hewlett-
Packard to allow him to post the scriptures, or for Hewlett-Packard to
abandon its diversity campaign.3 2 Under Title VII jurisprudence, if
these accommodations impose an undue burden on the employer,
then they will not withstand a Title VII challenge.3 Comporting with
several previous cases,34 the court determined that allowing Peterson
to post the scripture passages would pose an undue burden on
Hewlett-Packard, holding that "an employer need not accommodate
an employee's religious beliefs if doing so would result in
discrimination against his co-workers or deprive them of contractual
or other statutory rights."35 The court also concluded that Peterson's
second requested accommodation would have created an undue
burden on Hewlett-Packard by imposing upon its right to promote
diversity and tolerance among its employees.36
Although the court's opinion is a straightforward application of
Title VII jurisprudence, when separately situated among the relevant
line of cases, an important tension is revealed. A brief synthesis of
Title VII with emphasis on its pertinence to religion and sexual
29. Id. at 603.
30. Id. at 603-05.
31. Id. at 606. The court made this assumption "with considerable reservations,
however, because we seriously doubt that the doctrines to which Peterson professes
allegiance compel any employee to engage in either expressive or physical activity
designed to hurt or harass one's fellow employees." Id.
32. Id. at 606-07.
33. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (finding
that to allow an employee to have Saturdays off for his observation of the Sabbath would
force the employer to impose unequal treatment as to other employees, constituting an
undue burden on the employer).
34. See id. at 81; Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 607.
36. Id. at 608 ("These values and good business practices are appropriately promoted
by Hewlett-Packard's workplace diversity program. To require Hewlett-Packard to
exclude homosexuals from its voluntarily adopted program would create an undue
hardship for the company.").
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orientation, when explored in conjunction with the facts of this case,
clearly exposes this particular tension and its ramifications.
II. TITLE VII: AN OVERVIEW
Title VII has developed a complex jurisprudence despite the
brevity of its statutory language. As such, its application can be
characterized as pertaining to two categorically distinct
circumstances. The first covers discrimination resulting in either
explicitly disparate treatment or disparate impact to an employee
based on an enumerated protected status.37 The second includes the
endurance of either employer harassment based on an employee's
membership in a Title VII protected class or employer complicity in
such harassment resulting in a hostile work environment for the
employee.3" Title VII's protection from discrimination on the basis of
religion also affirmatively requires employers to reasonably
accommodate its employees' religious practices.39  The statute
specifies, however, that a claim against an employer for failure to
accommodate a religious practice is subject to the employer's defense
that the accommodation requested would pose an undue burden on
the employer.4" As noted above, Peterson brought his unsuccessful
Title VII claims against Hewlett-Packard under the disparate impact
and failure to accommodate theories.
Beyond its articulated holding, however, the facts of Peterson
also implicate potentially significant ramifications for Title VII claims
based on the hostile work environment theory of harassment,41 and it
is this theory of Title VII recovery with which this Recent
Development is principally concerned. This claim is most commonly
associated with protection from sexual harassment stemming from
Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, but it is
applicable to all of Title VII's enumerated groups of employees
37. See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
59 (2001).
38. See id. at 118-22.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000eo) (2000). The duty is imposed via the statute's definition of
religion, which reads:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
Id.
40. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
41. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 607.
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protected by the statute.42 As such, successful claims of harassment
on the basis of religion have been litigated applying the analysis
employed in sexual harassment claims.43 Within this jurisprudential
scheme, an employer can be held liable for either quid pro quo
harassment (requiring the performance or nonperformance of some
religious activity in exchange for favorable working conditions) 44 or
for overt status-based harassment that creates a hostile work
environment for the employee.45 Harassment that creates a hostile
work environment for an employee is the more common type of
harassment claim, and that claim is analyzed here.
Harassment on the basis of religion is somewhat unique vis-a-vis
the other Title VII protected classes. Courts have predictably
recognized harassment of employees on the basis of their religion.46
In addition, however, federal courts have articulated that the analysis
of hostile work environment harassment theoretically applies to cases
brought by employees claiming religious discrimination because of
their employers' refusal to halt harassing proselytizing in the
workplace.47  Although Peterson's facts did not require a
determination of the issue of religious harassment, its language is
nonetheless significant with regard to religious harassment claims.
When determining the extent to which an accommodation would
pose an undue burden on an employer, courts have recognized
employers' potential liability for retaliatory religious harassment
claims brought by employees on the receiving end of such
proselytizing. 48 The two leading cases to address this issue are Wilson
v. U.S. West Communications9 and Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of
Richmond.5" In Wilson, the plaintiff filed a Title VII claim after she
was discharged for refusing to remove from her clothing an anti-
42. See MICHAEL WOLF ET AL., RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 55 (1998).
43. Id. at 53.
44. See Blalock v. Metals Trades, 775 F.2d 703, 704-06 (6th Cir. 1985) (permitting an
employee who was fired after refusing to submit to the authority of a self-proclaimed
"apostle" who had influence over the employee's managers to recover under Title VII).
45. See Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984) (finding that a
Jewish employee's supervisor was aware of discriminatory treatment and made no attempt
to stop it).
46. See id.
47. See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996);
Wilson v. U.S. West Comm., 58 F.3d 1337, 1339-41 (8th Cir. 1995).
48. See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1021; Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339.
49. 58 F.3d 1337.
50. 101 F.3d 1012.
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abortion button depicting a photograph of a fetus. 1 The button
caused serious disruption at her workplace and caused other
employees to file grievances for religious harassment. Although
Wilson's supervisors repeatedly requested that she remove the button
or comply with alternative accommodations, she refused, stating that
she was compelled to wear it as a "living witness" to her religiously
based opposition to abortion. 3 As a result of her noncompliance with
her employer's requests, Wilson was ultimately discharged. 4 In
finding for U.S. West, the court not only determined that U.S. West
had offered Wilson a reasonable accommodation but also clearly
articulated that "Title VII does not require an employer to allow an
employee to impose his religious views on others. The employer is
only required to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
views."55
In Chalmers,56 the Fourth Circuit was faced with similar facts
when the plaintiff was discharged after mailing letters to co-workers
imploring them to repent and chastising them for their sins.57
Chalmers was subsequently terminated. Her employer explained that
the letters had a "negative impact on working relationships, disrupted
the workplace, and inappropriately invaded employee privacy."58 In
Chalmers, the court explicitly indicated the important tension in such
a case: "If Tulon had the power to authorize Chalmers to write such
letters, and if Tulon had granted Chalmers' request to write the
letters, the company would subject itself to possible suits ... claiming
that Chalmers' conduct violated their religious freedoms or
constituted religious harassment."5 9 This type of tension was also
evident in Peterson.' The court in Peterson recognized that if
Hewlett-Packard had allowed Peterson to keep the scripture
passages, they could have been susceptible to suit under a religious
harassment theory by other employees.61
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, on the other
51. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1338-40.
52. Id. at 1339.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1339-40.
55. Id.
56. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1014-17 (4th Cir. 1996).
57. Id. at 1015-16.
58. Id. at 1017.
59. Id. at 1021.
60. See Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. See id.
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hand, is not explicitly prohibited under Title VII. 62 Nevertheless, gay
and lesbian employees have been able to assert claims of harassment
or a hostile work environment citing discrimination on the basis of
sex in some cases.63 The Supreme Court recognized such a claim of
sexual harassment between people of the same sex in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services Inc.,' by allowing a claim of sexual
harassment by a man who had been violently sexually harassed by his
male co-workers. 65  Although the circumstances of his claim bore
distinct links to homophobic language and violence, the Court was
explicit that his claim would be allowed only as a claim for
discrimination on the basis of sex.66 The Court in Oncale suggested
that same-sex sexual harassment could be actionable in two basic
categories. The first would include circumstances with evidence that
the harasser was gay, and the second would include instances in which
the harasser was motivated by general hostility to the presence of
people of the same sex in the workplace.67 The Court had also
previously determined that a sexual harassment claim could exist if
the employee was harassed for not complying with socialized gender
expectations ("sex stereotyping"). 68 Ultimately the Court held that
same-sex sexual harassment should be analyzed within the context in
which it allegedly occurs, suggesting that "[t]he real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships. '69
Given the facts of Oncale, it seemed that the Court's holding
would offer greater leverage for gay and lesbian employees to bring
sexual harassment claims when they are harassed in ways that relate
to their sexual orientation. However, the response at the federal
appellate level has been mixed at best. The Third Circuit in Bibby v.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
63. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)
(concluding that Title VII covers same-sex harassment claims); Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a gay plaintiff had
successfully stated a cause of action under Title VII when he proved that his co-workers
engaged in inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature, and stating that a plaintiff's sexual
orientation need not enter the Title VII inquiry).
64. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.
65. Id. at 76-79.
66. Id. at 81-82.
67. See id. at 80-81.
68. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255-58 (1989) (finding, in the
context of a Title VII sexual discrimination claim, that sex stereotyping played a role in
denying partnership to a female manager of an accounting firm).
69. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
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Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Company7" explicitly rejected the
sexual harassment claim of a Coca-Cola employee who had been
physically assaulted and harassed by a co-worker using homophobic
epithets.7 The court concluded that because the behavior had been
motivated by Bibby's sexual orientation, and not his gender, he had
no valid Title VII claim.72 In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel,73 however,
the Ninth Circuit offered greater leeway to gay and lesbian employees
hoping to bring sexual harassment claims. Citing Oncale, the court
held that Medina Rene, an effeminate gay man who was repeatedly
grabbed and assaulted sexually and endured constant homophobic
epithets from his coworkers, did have a viable sexual harassment
claim.74 However, the court reiterated that Rene's claim was for
harassment and discrimination on the basis of sex, and not for
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.75
Despite the hope that Oncale engendered among advocates of
gay and lesbian rights,76 both Bibby and Rene confirmed subsequent
skepticism regarding the limited scope of Oncale's holding.77 Without
either broader judicial language subsuming sexual orientation under
protection from discrimination on the basis of sex or an explicit
legislative amendment to Title VII to include discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, gay and lesbian employees continue to be
limited in their possible Title VII harassment claims. Despite any
ambiguity in Title VII's coverage of the harassment gay and lesbian
employees experience in the workplace, discrimination and
harassment based purely upon a person's sexual orientation is not
actionable.78  For example, if employees were simply verbally
harassed on the basis of their sexual orientation, but not sexually
70. 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2001).
71. Id. at 259-60.
72. Id. at 265.
73. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 922 (2003).
74. Id. at 1063-64.
75. Id. at 1068.
76. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Ator, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: Overcoming the History of Judicial Discrimination in
Light of the "Common Sense" Standard, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 583, 585-86
(1998) (suggesting that gay and lesbian sexual harassment claims may be possible post-
Oncale).
77. See, e.g., C. Lee Winkelman, Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. and
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment In the Workplace: The Third Circuit Forecloses the
Possibility of Equal Treatment for Homosexuals Under Title VII, 55 SMU L. REV. 1825,
1825 (2002) (discussing Bibby's wording as a severe limitation on Oncale).
78. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998); Bibby v.
Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257,265 (3rd Cir. 2001).
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harassed, they would not have a valid claim under Title VII.
Therefore, Oncale and Rene suggest that in order for harassment of
gay and lesbian employees to fall under the purview of Title VII
protection on the basis of sex, the harassment must fall under one of
Oncale's categories.79  Several commentators have noted the
limitations this formulation creates in many likely scenarios of
workplace harassment."s
III. TITLE VII, RELIGION, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
PETERSON'S CONVERGENCE
Prior Title VII jurisprudence exposes some stark inconsistencies
in Peterson. The first inconsistency relates to the potential of a
religious harassment claim. As in Chalmers and Wilson,8 the court in
Peterson was quick to point out a difficulty accommodating
Peterson's religious beliefs-the possible liability for harassment
claims by his co-workers who felt harassed by his proselytizing.82 The
facts of this case demonstrated that since gay and lesbian employees
would not have an actionable claim for Peterson's harassment under
Title VII for harassment based on sexual orientation, they may have
had a claim for religious harassment (assuming of course that
Peterson's actions met the threshold requirements for recovery). 3
Although superficially it is logical for the court to protect employers
from liability under the very statute for which it seeks compliance, the
result is at best counterintuitive and could force employers to
scrutinize the possibility that a religious employee's acts constitute
harassment. While it seems logical to advocate careful monitoring of
potential harassing situations, the spirit of Title VII' suggests that the
effect of such monitoring should not inequitably bear on harassment
that is religious in nature.
The language of Peterson suggests that the spirit of Title VII
would mandate workplace protection of gay and lesbian employees,
despite the failure of Congress or the courts to do so explicitly. The
court in Peterson legitimizes the employer's interest in eradicating
79. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
80. See Jeremy S. Barber, Comment, Re-Orienting Sexual Harassment: Why Federal
Legislation is Needed to Cure Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 493,
506-07 (2002); Nailah A. Jaffree, Note, Halfway Out of the Closet: Oncale's Limitations in
Protecting Homosexual Victims of Sex Discrimination, 54 FLA. L. REV. 799, 824 (2002).
81. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
82. See Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2004).
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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homophobia from the workplace, stating, "Hewlett-Packard's efforts
to eradicate discrimination against homosexuals in its workplace were
entirely consistent with the goals and objectives of our civil rights
statutes generally. 85
However, the court's use of this language indicates a particularly
compelling irony-it acknowledges that the spirit of Title VII, as
manifested in its decision in Rene, would extend protection from
workplace harassment and discrimination to gay and lesbian people.86
Nonetheless, in its language, precedent, and in the limitations of Title
VII, such protections are not possible. In other words, although
Hewlett-Packard's efforts to prevent harassment of its gay employees
were protected, those gay employees could not have an actionable
claim of harassment on the basis of sexual orientation in their own
right.87
Altering the fact pattern of Peterson illustrates the inconsistency.
In the first hypothetical alteration, it is not Peterson, the religious
employee, bringing the claim for discrimination on the basis of his
religion, but instead a gay employee bringing a claim for religious
harassment based on the hostile work environment stemming from
Richard Peterson's homophobic actions. In that case, the gay
employee could possibly have a Title VII religious harassment or
hostile work environment claim because of Peterson's persistent
condemnation of his gay and lesbian co-workers in religious terms.88
Essentially, because Richard Peterson's harassment was based not
simply in homophobia but in his religion, that gay employee,
assuming Hewlett-Packard had not taken action to remedy the
situation, would likely have an actionable claim under Title VII's
protection. Indeed, the court's opinion acknowledged Hewlett-
Packard's potential liability for such a Title VII claim.89
A second hypothetical demonstrates an additional inconsistency.
Imagine that Peterson, instead of responding to the diversity
campaign with scripture passages, expressed his disapproval of his gay
and lesbian co-workers with posters expressing his views in a secular
context. Had Peterson simply begun to post visible homophobic
85. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603-04 (citing Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864,
870 (9th Cir. 2001) (gender stereotyping violates Title VII) and Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Title VII forbids same-sex
harassment)).
86. Id.
87. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3rd Cir. 2001).
88. See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012,1021 (4th Cir. 1996).
89. See Peterson, 358 F.3d at 608.
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statements in his cubicle or to persistently use epithets towards his
gay and lesbian co-workers (without accompanying sexually based
harassment or gender stereotyping comments), those gay and lesbian
coworkers would not have an actionable Title VII claim.9 ° However,
Hewlett-Packard, as articulated in Peterson, would certainly have a
valid interest in eradicating the harassment and disciplining the
offending employee.9 Unfortunately, if this scenario were to exist in
a different workplace, where management failed to defend its gay and
lesbian employees (or indeed, as could be the case in some
workplaces, encouraged such harassment), then those employees
would have no Title VII action. 2
The silent gay parties in Peterson illuminate not only the
inconsistencies within Title VII harassment jurisprudence but, more
importantly, the interesting interplay between those inconsistencies.
In the case of religious employees who attempt to proselytize at work,
various federal courts have consistently limited such employees'
ability to do so and thus have enabled employers to provide a work
environment which is free from harassment 93-both to avoid a Title
VII action by a non-religious employee and to promote a positive,
productive work environment.94 However, as Peterson suggests, the
scrutiny under which religiously based harassment is analyzed is
greater than the scrutiny of harassment that is not religiously based.
If an employee creates a hostile work environment for a co-
worker who does not fall under one of Title VII's protected classes,
the co-workers affected by that behavior do not have an actionable
claim under federal law. Again, an employee could have a possible
claim against Hewlett-Packard if Peterson's actions created a hostile
work environment, but not if similar actions were not religiously
based. This discrepancy has a particular impact on those employees
who are harassed on the basis of their sexual orientation, because
those employees are one of the very few "discrete and insular
90. See Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265.
91. See Peterson, 358 F.3d at 608.
92. The Human Rights Campaign, a national political action committee representing
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community through legislative and community
advocacy, collected hundreds of stories from people who had experienced harassment and
discrimination at their workplace because of their sexual orientation. See DOCUMENTING
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 1, at 8-37. These stories articulate employees' experiences
of assault, physical threats, constant epithets, and discharge simply on the basis of sexual
orientation. Id.
93. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
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minorities"95 ignored by Title VII.
Likewise, Peterson exposes a circumstance in which a gay or
lesbian employee could experience discriminatory harassment or
hostile work environment as a result of actions similar to Peterson's,
but would have no Title VII recourse. This leaves gay and lesbian
employees at the mercy of sensitive and conscientious employers,
though many gay and lesbian employees are not so favorably
employed. 96 This dichotomy is problematic given the efforts of Title
VII to allow individual employees to assert their rights within the
workplace 97-an employer has an acknowledged and protected legal
interest in promoting a safe work environment for its gay and lesbian
employees, but those employees have no recourse with which to
advocate for such an environment on their own.
Concedely, this apparent inconsistency, in large part, is the result
of the interaction between employment law and Title VII in general.
Title VII functions to protect workers in an employment-at-will
context, and it stands to reason that courts would place priority on an
employer's freedom to monitor the conduct of its own workplace. It
also comports with statutory logic that courts will guard employers
from conflicting risks of liability under Title VII. Nonetheless,
despite the immediate jurisprudential logic, the tension described in
this Recent Development remains important and worthy of further
exploration. It also demands an analysis of the conflicting interests of
employers and employees, and suggests the need to carve out real
protections for employees from harassment which comport with the
spirit of Title VII.
It is also important to concede that judges are loath to recognize
a particular group for Title VII protection if such protection is not
explicit in the statutory language.98 As such, ideally, legislative action
would add sexual orientation to the protected categories of Title VII.
As the court in Peterson intimated, the spirit, if not the language of
Title VII, compels protection of employees from harassment resulting
in a hostile work environment. Indeed, many have advocated for
95. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937).
96. See supra note 92.
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); Adams v. U.S. Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 932 F. Supp. 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Title VII was designed to eradicate
unlawful discrimination, and the private right of action against an employer was intended
to provide a remedy for such discrimination.").
98. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d. Cir. 2001)
("Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society. Congress has
not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such harassment." (internal
citations omitted)).
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such explicit protection.9 9 Even without explicit statutory language,
however, judges could also carve out a broader interpretation of
"discrimination on the basis of sex" to include discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. If courts consider that all gay and lesbian
people regardless of their physical presentation do in fact violate
societal gender roles, it is fair to consider any harassment of people
on the basis of sexual orientation to fall within the purview of
Oncale's sex stereotyping category." However, despite efforts by
litigators to suggest an interpretation of the statute to that effect,
courts have yet to hold as such.10 1
These solutions still leave open the broader question of the
court's heightened scrutiny of religiously based harassment.
Professor David Yamada has suggested a ubiquitous claim for hostile
work environment as a solution to this problem. 102 Although beyond
the scope of this Recent Development, this approach remains an
important consideration in the development of employment law, and
Peterson suggests a particularly salient angle from which to analyze
how the law regulates harassment within the workplace. Gay and
lesbian people are not the only group of people subject to severe
workplace harassment, yet the claims that individuals may bring when
they work in a hostile environment are extremely limited. Many
workplace scenarios suggest the need for a broader and more
comprehensive remedy for the problem of workplace harassment.
While explicitly seeking to diminish the import of Title VII's attempt
to name and remedy discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, or religion, this Recent Development
proposes an analysis of Title VII harassment jurisprudence as
separate from its discrimination jurisprudence in order to encourage a
rethinking of the type of work environment realities implicitly
condoned by federal employment law. As a result of this exercise in
statutory logic, it encourages a rethinking of Title VII protection so as
99. See, e.g., Theodore A. Schroeder, Fables of the Deconstruction: The Practical
Failures of Gay and Lesbian Theory in the Realm of Employment Discrimination, 6 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 333, 366-67 (1998) (advocating for the addition of sexual
orientation as a protected class under Title VII).
100. See, e.g., Matthew Clark, Comment, Stating a Title VII Claim for Sexual
Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal Theories Available After Rene v.
MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REv. 313, 330-31 (2003) (arguing that discrimination
based upon sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII if associative theory is
available to sexual discrimination plaintiffs).
101. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 12, at 523 (arguing for the use of a status blind
proscription against employee harassment to ensure at least a minimal level of dignity in
the workplace).
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explicitly to protect gay and lesbian employees, and to address
workplace harassment in a holistic way that seeks to avoid the lack of
redress for employees who must work in a hostile work environment.
CONCLUSION
On its facts, Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard was a victory for the
interests of tolerance within the workplace. The decision showed the
court's willingness to recognize the importance of having a work
environment that is safe for all employees, and to find that religious
beliefs cannot trump that interest. Nonetheless, considering this case
within the context of the larger body of Title VII jurisprudence
exposes problematic inconsistencies in the scope of its protection and
in its application to workplace harassment. Title VII therefore
inadequately addresses the broader problem of discrimination against
gay and lesbian employees in particular and workplace harassment in
general. The jurisprudential development that this case will facilitate
demands our attention and suggests that a reevaluation of the
language of Title VII and the conclusions of its application is
necessary.
CHRISTINE R. WILLIAMS
[Vol. 83
